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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is taken from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment
entered on August 22, 1 Q 86, by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of
Utah.

Notice of Appea] to the Utah Supreme Court on September

16, 1986.

Appellate review was subsequently assigned to this

Court on January ?8, 1987.
Plaintiff

filed

her

Complaint

Defendant on August 5, 1985.
child

custody

and

a

divorce

from

The parties later stipulated to

partial

stipulation was incorporated

seeking

property

distributionf

into a Stipulation

which

for Temporary

Order, and Temporary Order, dated October 2, 3 986.

The matter

was tried to the Court on the merits on June 18, 1986 and the
Court

entered

its Findings

of Fact, Conclusions

Decree of Divorce on August 22, 1986.

iii

of Law, and

STATUTES REQUIRING INTERPRETATION
1.

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (1985) - see Addendum.

2.

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10 (1977) - see Addendum.

iv

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time of trial, Plaintiff and Defendant had been
married in excess of 18 years.

Mr. Marchant did not want the

divorce when it was filed and would have even reconciled the day
of trial.

(Tr., p. 21, lines 1-7).

For the first 7 years of the marriage, the parties were
childless and the two children, Brandon and Sara, were adopted
when it appeared that the parties were not able to bear their
own natural children.

The children were undoubtedly the light

and focus of the parties1 attention at the time of birth, and,
in Mr. Marchant1s case, they continue to be.

The children were

raised in a stable family setting for a few years, but then,
changes began to occur in the relationship of the parties, with
the major contributing problems being created by the Plaintiff.
Defendant will not attempt to repeat many of the facts that
have been set forth in Plaintiff's brief.

However, additional

facts need to be stated; facts which clearly and persuasively
support the trial court's finding that the best interests of the
children would be served by residing with their father.
these facts that tipped

It is

the scales in favor of the father

because the court, as did Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the clinical
psychologist, found that both parents were capable of being
awarded custody of the minor children.

A.
only

Facts Relating to Custody.

herself

should

be

as a witness

awarded

At trial, Plaintiff called

in support

custody.

of her

Plaintiff's

consists of only 17 pages in the record.

claim

direct

that

she

examination

(Tr., p. 26-43).

On

the other hand, Defendant called not only himself, but 3 other
witnesses who gave the court considerable insight as to which
parent should have custody of the children.
1.

Don

Marchant.

Mr.

Marchant

was,

of

course,

concerned about the relationship Mrs. Marchant was maintaining
with

her

convince

boss,
the

Doug

court

Fonnesbeck.

that

it

was

While
a

Plaintiff

casual

tried

relationship,

to
Mr.

Marchant did not see it that way and apparently, neither did the
trial court.

Mr. Marchant testified that he became concerned

when Plaintiff

started

telling him that Mr. Fonnesbeck was a

wonderful man, that he was understanding and that she very much
appreciated him.

Mr. Marchant was also told that Mr. Fonnesbeck

had a "dumpy wife", that he wasn't understood at home, and soon
Mr. Marchant started hearing things around town to the effect
that
work.

something was going on between his wife and
(Tr., p.72, line 16-23).

someone at

When Mr. Marchant asked his

wife about that involvement, Mrs. Marchant told him that she had
a strong attraction for Doug Fonnesbeck.

When asked if it was a

sexual attraction, she admitted that it was.
1-3) .

2

(Tr., p.73, lines

Even

though

Mr.

Marchant

only

had

visitation

with

the

children on the weekend for almost a year (after Mrs. Marchant
moved

and

went

to

Salt

Lake

City) , Mr.

Marchant

testified

concerning the activities he had with the children as follows:
"We've been fishing, we've been hunting, we've been to
Disneyland, we've been bowling, we've been swimming,
we've been to the Shakespearean Festival in Cedar
City, we've been to church, we've been on boy scout
trips, we have done a lot of things, horseback riding,
we've worked and we have done farm work, we've been to
the rodeos." (Tr., p. 88, lines 8-13).
Mr. Marchant

also testified

that his

forest service job

allowed him to have a flexible work schedule, he had the option
to work anytime between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00
that he could work

p.m.,

4 days a week and have 3 days off, that

because of a supervisory position, he could organize his own
time to suit his particular needs.

In addition, Mr. Marchant

was entitled to 36 days of annual paid vacation.

(Tr., p. 89,

lines 7-12).
Plaintiff's sister Helen lived with her in Salt Lake City.
Mr. Marchant objected to Helen being a mother to his children.
Mr. Marchant felt that she was a bad inflxience on the children
because her moral values did not coincide with what he thought
was proper.

(Tr., p. 89, lines 19-25; p. 90, lines 1-5).

Testimony was given by Mr. Marchant that he would hire a
housekeeper or someone to be at the home at all times when he
was not there and that he would do so, because of his concern
that the children

should

not be
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left home

alone, as he had

determined to be the case after the children moved to Salt Lake
and resided with their mother.

(Tr., p. 91, lines 8-10; lines

23-24; p. 92, lines 1-22).
Mr. Marchant also acknowledged that he had struck his wife
on one occasion, and the court made specific inquiry as to that
event.

After the court made inquiry, Plaintiff1s counsel (then

David L. Mower) further inquired of Mr. Marchant as follows:
Q
Karen was talking to me while you were
giving your answer. The argument that led up to the
striking was over the summer arrangement for the
children, wasn't it?
A
In truth, there were a whole bunch of
things. It was one of those kinds of arguments that
there probably should be a statute of limitations on
how far back you can go. Fonnesbeck's relationship,
our problems, the children, it was all there — and I
slapped her. (Tr., p. Ill, lines 1-B).
2.

Dale Hale Woolsey.

Mr. Woolsey testified that he

had known Don Marchant for approximately 10 years and that
the two had served in a bishopric

in the LDS Church.

He

testified that Mr. Marchant spent quite a bit of time with
the children

and even before the parties

separated, Mr.

Marchant would take the children fishing and hunting and
that after the separation, he would spend 24 hours a day
with

the

children

when

he

could.

(Tr., p.

112, lines

18-25; p. 113, lines 4-7).
3.

Kay M. Bowden.

Mrs. Bowden had been a friend and

neighbor of Plaintiff and Defendant for 11 years and was
employed as a teacher's aide at the elementary school where

4

the children
City.

attended

prior

to their move

to Salt Lake

At one time, she considered Karen Marchant to be her

best friend and thought they had a lot in common up until
about

1982.

(Tr., p.

114, lines

20-25;

p.

115, lines

13-19).

Mrs. Bowden further indicated that Mr. Marchant

was

one who

the

church

—

brought

that he was

the children

to

always there, which

school
didn't

and

to

often

happen in all father/children relationships.
Mrs.
decided

to

Bowden

try

to

testified

talk

that

to Karen.

on

Of

one

this

occasion,

she

experience, Mrs.

Bowden testified as follows:
"This is my chance.
I havenf t talked to
Karen for a long time. Karen had, even her
appearance changed. Her dress had changed.
Everything was for Karen, it seemed like.
We no longer were in her field. And I confronted her.
'Karen, are you sure these
trips are that important?' And she let me
know and she let me know in no uncertain
terms that she would not work for the
peanuts that I worked for. She was going to
the top and she said, 'When I leave my home,
I
leave homemade
cookies
and
homemade
bread.'
And I said, 'Karen, that's not a
marriage, that's not a family,' and that's
the last she ever talked to me."
(Tr. , p.
116, lines 8-18).
When

asked

about

what

she

observed

between

inter-

action of her own child and Sara, after Sara moved to Salt
Lake City with her mother, Mrs. Bowden testified that Sara
appeared

to be more hyperactive

than she could remember,

having previously observed Sarah at the Bowdens' home, in

5

the neighborhood generally, and in school during the 1984-85
school year.

(Tr., p. 116, lines 19-25; p. 117, line 1) .

She testified that she maintained the records for the school
and that at the beginning of the year Sara was a top math
student, but by April of that year she was at the bottom.
She

further

advised

stated

that

Mrs. Marchant

that Sara would need

was

notified

remedial help the

and

following

year, and that it was up to Mrs. Marchant to let the school
(in

Salt

Lake)

significance

know.

is the

(Tr. , p.

fact

that

on

117,

lines

1-10).

Of

cross-examination, Mrs.

Marchant admitted that in the year she had the children in
Salt Lake, Sara was below average in several areas and not
above average in any area.
4.
known

Dave Brown.

both

Plaintiff

(Tr., p. 59, lines 15-20).

Mr. Brown also testified that he had
and

Defendant

for

approximately

10

years and that he had children close to the ages of Brandon
and Sara.

He testified that Mr. Marchant was a good example

as a father and admired him for the time he spent with his
children.

He also testified that he observed a change in

Mrs. Marchant during the 3 years prior to the time she left
the family home and moved to Salt Lake City.
A
Well, it has been mentioned before,
Karen was always active, a loving person. My
wife and her were good friends. I thought a
lot of Karen. And then the past few years
she just slowly changed, especially when she
started to work at her new job. And I don't
remember —
Zions Bank was when I really
noticed, we noticed her changing a lot.

6

Q

What ways did she change?

A
It seemed that I felt like she
forgot her goals that was important to her in
her religious beliefs, in her marriage, and
in her relationship with her children.
I
also observed the kids coming home from
school
and
being
alone, and
that was
something that upset me that Karen didn't
care enough not to work when her kids were
home. (Tr., p. 124, lines 7-20).
When asked on cross-examination if he thought that
Karen was

a good mother, he

indicated

that he did not.

(Tr., p. 125, lines 9-12).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

trial

court

acted

within

the

bounds

of

its

discretion in making the determinations of custody and property
distribution.

The

trial

court's

findings

concerning

child

custody were specifically related to the best interests of the
children, their living conditions, and the respective parental
qualifications
approach

to

and

attitudes.

property

division

Likewise,
and

alimony

the
was

trial

court's

equitable

and

within the recognized bounds of discretion.
2.

The trial court fully and appropriately considered the

best interests of the children and other pertinent criteria in
awarding
regarding

custody
child

to

the

custody

defendant.

are

based

on

The

specific

and

articulate

findings
factors

relevant to the best interests of the children as well as the
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past conduct and demonstrated moral character of the parties.
These criteria are statutorily prescribed in U.C.A. § 30-3-10
(1977) and are among those set forth in case precedent and expert
commentary.

Being faced with a choice between "good and better,"

the trial court specifically based its decision on the respective
home environments, Plaintiff's evolving moral attitudes as a
factor

in

the

marital

breakup,

and

selfishness at the family's expense.
determinative criteria were based

Plaintiff's

apparent

All of these and other

in applicable law and well

within the trial court's bounds of discretion.
3.

An award of alimony was unnecessary and would have been

inappropriate

under

the

circumstances.

Both

parties

were

employed; each having good job security and each having an income
sufficient

to

meet

their

respective

needs.

Both

parties

admittedly had been living beyond their means, and therefore,
neither

could

lifestyle."

expect

to

continue

with

their

"accustomed

Neither party represented any great potential for

becoming a public charge. No alimony was warranted and the trial
court, as a matter of discretion and obvious choice, made no such
award.
4,

The property distribution was fair and equitable in all

respects, and the trial court exercised appropriate discretion in
making its awards.
marital

assets

Plaintiff received exactly one-half of all

except

for

defendant's

pension

fund.

The

Plaintiff will be "cashed out" of a diversity of family property

8

including

real

property

whose

values

eroded since the decree was entered.

have

property

discretion.
access

as

a

matter

economically

By at least one stated rule

of thumb, Plaintiff might have received
marital

been

of

only one-third of the

acceptable

trial

court

Defendant would have had to quit his job to have

to the

accumulated

which would have worked

pension

amount

sought

by

Plaintiff

an unfair hardship on Defendant.

The

trial court's award was just, equitable and devoid of prejudicial
discretion.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF ITS
DISCRETION IN MAKING THE DETERMINATIONS OF CUSTODY AND
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
The factors upon which the trial court relied in rendering
its decision

are clearly

stated

and properly

resolution of the issues before it.

applied

to the

The court's observations

with respect to the best interests of the children and other
pertinent
forward.

custody

considerations

are

rational

and

straight-

Likewise, the property values and the basis for the

respective awards are specifically spelled out.
On

review

of

such

issues,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

stated:
The trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and
property interests. A party appealing therefrom has

9

has

the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial
error;
or
the
evidence
clearly
preponderates against the findings; or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.
English v. English, 565 P.2d

409, 410

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d

1359

(Utah 1977).

See also

(Utah 1974) and Baker v.

Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976).
Trial

court

emphasized

in

Jorgensen,

599

discretion

child
P. 2d

is

custody
510

(Utah

particularly

decisions.
1979)

the

In
Utah

broadened

and

Jorgensen
Supreme

v.

Court

emphasized their position with respect to alteration of custody
decisions stating:
[T]he
trial
court
is
given
particularly
broad
discretion in the area of child custody incident to
separation or divorce proceedings. A determination of
the "best interests of the [children]n frequently
turns on numerous factors which the trial court is
best suited to assess, given its proximity to the
parties and the circumstances. Only where trial court
action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an
abuse of discretion
should
the appellate
forum
interpose its own judgment.
Id. at 511-12, quoted

in, Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d

1124, 1125

(1985) .
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court in the
present case has articulated specific findings relative to the
best

interests

of the children, their

living

conditions, the

relative parental qualifications, and parental disposition with
respect to the care and nurturing of the minor children.

10

All of the findings made by the trial court in this matter
are

completely

within

its

discretion.

There

was

no

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law which resulted in
substantial and prejudicial
clearly

preponderates

serious

inequity

abuse

against

resulting

of the trial

error, there is no evidence which
any

finding, nor

which might

court's discretion.

custody of the children, there

is there

otherwise manifest
With

is nothing

respect

any
an

to the

in evidence

or on

record to persuasively show that the custody determination made
by the trial court is "flagrantly unjust" or contrary to the
best interests and welfare of the children and the family.

POINT TWO
THF TRIAL COURT FULLY AND APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN AND OTHER PERTINENT
CRITERIA IN AWAPDING CUSTODY TO THE DEFENDANT
It is genere^lly understood that in a divorce action, the
court has and retains jurisdiction over matters of child custody
as directed by Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985).
making

the

initial

determination

of

which

of

the

In

divorcing

parents should have custody, the court gets its direction from
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-10 0^77) which states:
[W]henever a marriage is declared void or dissolved
the court shall make such order for the future care
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just
and proper. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the pcist
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties . . . . (Emphasis added.)
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From
focused

on

this

statutory

categorical

instruction,

consideration

of

recent
some

opinions
of

the

have

factors

which may be determinative of the best interests of the child.
See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).

38

(Utah

1982);Pusey v.

In both of these opinions, the

court cites factors which might be considered in developing an
overall view of the best interests of the child, as indicated by
the above-cited statute.
Plaintiff

cites

Hutchinson

and

Pusey

in

her

brief

to

support her position that the court is somehow bound solely to
these criteria.

However, the language of the various cases is

most illustrative with respect both to the various factors, and
the court's discretion in applyirg or dealing with them.

For

example, in Hutchison, the court emphasizes the broad discretion
vested

in the trial court both as a preamble

to the

factors

rioted in the opinion, and in the court's concluding remarks on
the point, statincr:
Some factors the court may consider in determining the
child's best interests relate primarily to the child's
feelings or special needs; the preference of the
child;
keeping
siblings
together;
the
relative
strencrth of the child's bond with one or both of the
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the
general interest in continuing previously determined
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well
adjusted.
Other factors relate primarily to the
prospective custodian's character or status or their
capacity or willingness to function as parents; moral
character and emotional stability, duration and depth
of desire for custody, ability to provide personal
rather than surrogate care, significant impairment of
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse,

12

excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for having
relinquished
custody
in
the
past;
religious
compatibility with the child; kinshipf includinq in
extraordinary circumstances, step-parent status; and
financial
condition.
(These
factors
are
not
necessarily listed in order of importance.)
Assessments of the applicability and relative weight
of the various factors in a particular case lie within
the discretion of the trial court. "Only where trial
court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute
an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum
Ln
interpose
its
own
judgment,
(Parenthetical
original. Emphasis added.)
Id., citing Jorgensen, supra, at 512.
Certainly

the

court

generate

did
a

not

finite

intend
list

by
of

this
factors

helpful

instruction

to

to

considered.

The court in effect added to the list in Pusey:

be

We believe that the choice in competing child custody
claims should instead be based on function-related
tactors. Prominent among these, though not exclusive,
is the identity of the primary caretaker during the
marriage. Other factors should include the identity
of the parent with greater flexibility to provide
personal care for the child and the identity of the
parent with whom the child has spent most of his or
her time pending custody determination if that period
has been lengthy. Another important factor should be
the stability of the environment provided by each
parent. (Fmphasis added.)
Id. at 120, citing Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody
in the Trial

and Appellate

Courts, 18 Fam. L. Q.

1

(Spring

1 984^ .
It is interesting and pertinent to note that the general
emphasis

of

preference

the

Fusey

case

for determining

was

to

disavow

the custodial

any

gender-based

parent.

It is also

interesting in that case that the court makes reference to the

13

earlier

hypothetical

scenario

where

"all

other

things

being

equal," there was a presumed preference to place children with
the mother.

Such a preference or presumption was specifically

overruled in Pusey.

However, in the case at bar, based on the

testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart, the clinical psychologist,
the court specifically found that both parties are good parents,
and both parties could be awarded custody of the minor children.
(Tr. at page 7.)

This sets up the situation alluded to in Pusey

where from the start all things appeared to be equal.

The trial

court subsequently considered other criteria to "break the tie."
The court found itself in a situation quite similar to that
of the trial court in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) .
There it appeared that both the father and the mother were fit
and

proper

and

it was

recognized

that

the

court's

decision

required a finding of what was " ' reasoncible and necessary1
the

'best

interest'

of

the

child

—

a

standard

which

for
may

frequently and of necessity require a choice between good and
better."

Id. at 55.

In the present case, in deciding between good and better,
the

trial

court

articulated

various

specific

governed its ultimate decision on custody.

findings

which

Some of the stated

findings are among those cited in Hutchinson and Pusey.

Those

findings dealing specifically with custody are the following:
1.
Finding of Fact 5.A.
That both the plaintiff and
defendant are good parents, and that both parties could be
awarded custody of the minor children.
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As discussed

above, this

finding wherein the court knew

that it was dealing with a "close call," placed the court in the
difficult position choosing between good and better.
In Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985), the lower court
was

similarly

better.

faced

with

a

determination

between

good

and

In affirming the lower court's award of custody to the

mother, this court stated:
In the instant case, the evidence, depending upon how
it is viewed, could support a custody award to either
party. In such case, we will defer to the judgment of
the trial court. It was therefore not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to award custody to
defendant.
Id. at 1125
2. Finding of Fact 5.B. That the marriage entered into
between Plaintiff and Defendant was broken by the actions on the
part of Plaintiff which were not justified.
This finding supports the court's apparent conclusion that
Mrs. Marchant's unjustified
and her unstable
with

a parental

acts of selfishness and

and changing moral values were
role.

Without

listing

any

rebellion

inconsistent

specific actions,

this finding is indicative of the court's consideration of the
"past conduct and demonstrated moral character of each of the
parties," particularly when viewed in light of the testimony of
Dale Woolsey, Kay Bowden and Dave Brown.

Since this standard is

clearly articulated in the custody statute, it would certainly
be within the court's discretion to apply such a finding to its
overall custody decision.

15

3. Finding of Fact 5.C. That when the plaintiff vacated
the family home in Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City,
Utah, in September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in
approximately November or December of 1985, her sister, another
woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together with her
minor child. That the standard of living under which plaintiff
has been residing while having the temporary custody of the
children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what it should have
been nor was it in the best interests of the children.
There
related

to

is

no question

the best

that

interests

this

finding

is

of the children.

specifically
The

finding

recognizes that the children were living in a situation where
two

families

were

found

under

the

same

roof.

Testimony

indicated that Plaintiff's sister, Helen, did much of the caring
for and "mothering" of the children.

There is direct testimony

that this "mother figure" had no qualms about bringing alcohol
into the home which necessitated specific moral instruction to
the children with respect to it.
By comparison, the father's home presented no such moral
obstacles, and

in fact it represented

the childrens1

closest

association with the typical and traditional home life.
matter

of

the

childrens

best

interests,

the

trial

As a
court

disapproved of the communal lifestyle presented by the Salt Lake
City arrangement in favor of the traditional lifestyle in the
father's home and surroundings where the children had both been
raised since birth.
4. Finding of Fact 5.D. That during the latter part of
the marriage between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff became
involved with another man and this had an influence with the
court in determining what is the best interests of the minor
children.
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Again,

this

addresses

Plaintiff's

past

conduct

and

demonstrated moral character which is a statutory criteria for
determining child custody.

Although different conclusions may

be drawn from this finding with respect to the seriousness of
the involvement, the court need not be more specific or explicit
in its language.

There was some conflict in the evidence where

Plaintiff

that

stated

she

had

never

been

sexually

involved

outside the marriage; but, she admitted to spending some time
alone in a motel room with a man she admittedly loved to whom
she had

sexual attractions, and who had repeatedly given her

gifts and flowers.

(Tr., p. 72-76).

The trial court obviously

found it morally inappropriate for Mrs. Marchant to tolerate and
rejoice in these gifts from her boss.
indications

that

a new

relationship

These and other subtle
was

in bloom

allow

the

direct conclusion that such overtures aided the cooling process
in the marital relationship.

For Mrs. Marchant to flaunt these

gifts from a man to whom she was not married, while not immoral
per se, had an obvious undermining effect on the marriage and,
at a minimum, presented to the children an unhealthy example of
matrimonial conduct.

Plaintiff argues that such instances of

gifts and routine associations with her boss do not go beyond
the

normal

"friendship

relationship

with

court obviously took a different view.

a man."

The

trial

Furthermore, to argue

that such behavior and such a relationship could have been in
any way "in the best interests of the children," is ludicrous.
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5. Finding of Fact 5.E. That during the
the marriage, Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and
not in the best interests of the family unit,
change was pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and
to the exclusion of the family unit.

latter years of
that change was
but rather the
for her benefit

Plaintiff's pursuit of personal, selfish interests at the
expense of the family unit is a resounding negative with respect
to the overall best interests of the children.

This notion is

i

consistent with the opinion of the psychologist, Elizabeth B.
Stewart, Ph.D., who, in her evaluation of Mrs. Marchant,

under

the heading "Capacity for Custody," states:
"Mrs. Marchant's desire for a better life for herself
very probably will be a disadvantage for the children
who may be exposed to a less desirable lifestyle."
(The entire context of Dr. Stewart's evaluation is attached in
the Addendum as Exhibit 5.)

i

In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, supra, the court was dealing
with a custodial contest between a parent and a non-parent.

The

court

parent

and

factors which would overrule the presumption.

In

recognized

articulated

a

presumption

in

favor

of

the

that context, all three of the factors which give rise to the
presumption must be absent:
That no strong mutual bond exists, that the parent
not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or
own interest and welfare for the child, and that
parent lacks the sympathy for an understanding of
child that is characteristic of parents generally.

has
her
the
the

Id. at 41.
Although the present case presents a contest between both
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parents, the fact that Plaintiff was given to her own desires
and benefits to the exclusion of the family unit was one of the
foremost
Marchant.

factors

warranting

that

custody

be

given

to

Mr.

Thenf the trial court's observations are consistent

with the Hutchinson court as to the practical effect upon the
children and the childrens1 best interests.
The cumulative effect of the Court's findings with respect
to child custody gives precise and ample indication of those
factors to which the Court looked in making its determination
between good

and better.

Considerations

of those

factors of

past conduct and demonstrated moral standards in addition to the
best interest of the children, as weighed by the trial court,
were sufficient to warrant the custody award to Defendant.

POINT THREE
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD
BEEN INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409

HAVE

(Utah 1977), the Utah

Supreme Court expressed the purpose of alimony as follows:
fT]he most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the wjfe from becoming a public charge.
English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411, citing Nais v. Nais, 107
Ariz. 411, 489 P.?d 48, 50 (1971).
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
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(Utah 1985), the Utah

Supreme Court quoted with approval this language in English, and
enumerated the three factors which must be considered in fixing
a reasonable alimony award:
1.
The financial conditions and needs of the
wife;
2.
The ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself;
3.
The ability of the husband
to provide
support.
Id., at 1075.
In

the

present

case,

Finding

of

Fact

10

specifically

provides that as of June 18th, 1986, "Plaintiff receives as net
income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and Defendant receive net
income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month."
earnings

is

Recognizing
custody

$793.00
that

per

the

month

Defendant

in

favor

had

been

The difference in
of

the

awarded

Defendant.
the

care,

and control of two minor children, together with the

incumbent

expenses

of

day-care

and

other

aspects

of

child

support, the numbers do not then become as disparate as they may
initially

appear.

The

Defendant

was

also

charged

with

the

responsibility to maintain health and accident insurance on the
minor children and for any costs not covered.
also charged with the responsibility

Defendant was

to pay past medical and

dental bills pursuant to the Temporary Order of the Court dated
October 2, 1985.

(Finding of Fact 12.)

saddled with the lion's
$32,800.

The Defendant remains

share of the marital debts

(Finding of Fact 13.)
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totalling

In terms of property division, Defendant was responsible
for payment of $40,250 to Plaintiff for equity from the sale of
the

farm,

which

contemplated

at

"need", was her

may

or

may

the

time.

expressed

not

take

place

Plaintiff's
desire

for

only

to return

the

values

indication

to

school.

of
This

would cost her $135.00 per semester hour and she testified that
she estimated her needs for alimony at $200.00 per month.
p. 43) .

(Tr.,

At the time of trial, Plaintiff earned net income of

$1,321.00 per month which allowed her to live in an area she
selected

and

satisfactory
Plaintiff had

in

a

residence

for herself
lived

and

that
the

she

thought

two children.

in Salt Lake City

during

was

totally

Furthermore,
the

separation

period without a temporary alimony award and did not seek one
during that period of time.
With respect to the factors enumerated in Jones v. Jones,
supra, it is evident that the trial court found in the Plaintiff
an ability to produce sufficient income for herself, that her
financial needs and conditions were not beyond her productive
ability, and that Defendant's ability to provide support was not
so substantial as to justify an award of alimony.

It is also

evident from the testimony, that both parties were living beyond
their means and that both would have to curtail their spending
and retreat to a point where they could utilize their available
income to satisfy their existing obligations.

21

In this context,

neither

party

"accustomed

would

life

have

been

style."

able

to

Plaintiff

had

maintain
been

his

or

working

her

as

a

secretary for Intermountain Health Care for some time with no
indication that her job was in jeopardy or that her income would
be any way affected by the divorce.

It would be difficult to

conclude

Plaintiff

from

such

facts

that

the

represented

a

potential for becoming a public chakge.
In Dorrity v. Dorrity, 645 P.2d 56

(Utah 1982) , the Utah

Supreme Court articulated the established standard of review in
alimony disputes as follows:
It is well settled that this court will not disturb
the trial court's distribution of property and award
of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown.
Dorrity v. Dorrity, 645 P.2d at 59.
Both parties' standard of living had been affected in the
negative.

Both parties were then

living beyond

their means.

Both parties are firmly established in their employment and each
has continuing employment possibilities. Neither party presents
any great potential for becoming a public charge.
alimony was warranted by the circumstances.
Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony
was

entirely

within

the

Court's

circumstances was that discretion
undue prejudice.

?2

Therefore, no

The finding that

(Finding of Fact No. 5) ,
discretion

exercised

and

under

no

to the extent of

POINT FOUR
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE IN ALL
RESPECTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE
DISCPETION IN MAKING ITS AWARDS
In the recent case of Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184

(1986),

the court was asked to review a disputed property distribution.
The Court cited its earlier opinion in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615
P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), for the following proposition:
[T]here is no fixed formula upon which to determine a
division of properties, it is a prerogative of the
court to make whatever disposition of property as it
deems fair, equitable and necessary for the protection
and welfare of the parties. In the division of marital
property, the trial judge has wide discretion, and his
findings will not be disturbed unless the record
indicates an abuse thereof.
Id. at 185, citing Fletcher, supra, at 122.
In the instant case, Plaintiff accurately points out that,
except

for

the

pension

plan,

the

Court

divided

the

marital

property equally between the parties and required in the form of
a Judgment, that the sum of $40,250 be paid to the Plaintiff over
a five year period, in yearly installments, with interest on the
amount

at

paragraph

the

rate

6-B.)

of

8%

Plaintiff

per

annum.

curiously

(Decree

overlooks

of

the

Divorce,
fact

that

Defendant was a] so required to pay all of the marital debts in
the approximate amount of $32,800.
For the Plaintiff to argue that she did not get an equal
share of

the

retirement

fund

and

that

therefore

award is inequitable and an abuse of discretion
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the property
is ludicrous.

Indeed, in this matter the Court might well have resorted to the
rule of thumb followed

in Cox v. Cox, 532 P. 2d 994

(Utah 1975)

wherein the court stated:
Because of the variableness and complexities involved
in family troubles there is no firm rule or formula
that can be uniformly applied in all cases in the legal
surgery necessary to severing such relationships which
will best serve the desired objective of allocating the
economic resources so that the parties involved can
reconstruct their lives in the most happy and useful
manner. However, as an aid in that endeavor, in the
past the courts have often resorted to a general "rule
of thumb" of one-third to the wife and two-thirds to
the husband? and that is what the court appears to have
done here.
Upon our survey of the circumstances of
these parties we see no reason to believe that the
application of that general formula was so inequitable
or unjust that we should interfere therewith.
Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d at 997.

(emphasis added)

Following the Cox rule, the court might well have fashioned
a less equitable result and stil3 have been within the bounds of
appropriate discretion.
Mr.

Marchant

testified

gotten any distribution

that

the

only

way

he

could

have

from his pension was to quit his job.

Should this court wish to make further inquiry into the equities,
Defendant would likely offer Plaintiff $3,000 to assume $16,400
of the marital debt (one-half of the $32,800 total).

Also, this

court may wish to consider the fact that had Mr. Marchant been
able to withdraw $6,000 from his retirement fund, he would have
triggered an income tax liability for which he would have been
solely

responsible.

$6,000 tax-free.

Mrs.

Marchant

would

have

received

this

In order to avoid these tax consequences, Mr.
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Marchant's only alternative would have been to borrow the money,
incur additional interest expense, and place the remainder of his
unencumbered assets in further legal jeopardy.
There is no evidence that the property distribution was in
any way

a prejudicial

abuse of the trial court's discretion.

With property values in the Sevier Valley receding, in liquidated
dollars,

the

advantage.

practical

In

effect

has

worked

Graff v. Graff, 699 P.2d

to
765

the

Plaintiff's

(1985), the Utah

Supreme Court has observed the following rule on appellate review
of such matters:
The rule on appellate review affords considerable
deference
to
the
trial
court's
findings
and
conclusions. The burden is on the one attacking the
decree to show that the evidence does not support the
findings.
Id. at 766.
Plaintiff's allegation of inequity simply does not compute.
The real equities favor her and she suffers from no prejudice or
abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Appellate courts have generally

emphasized

that the trial

court is vested with certain presumptions of propriety in making
a

final

ruling

on

a given

matter.

This

general

presumption

favoring the intimacy of the trial forum and the trial court's
ultimate

discretion

regarding

factual
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and

legal

issues

has

typically been given even greater difference in domestic matters.
The trial court is given "particularly broad discretion in
the

area

of

child

custody."

Likewise,

as

to

financial

and

property interests, the trial court is vested with "considerable
latitude."
This
limits.
party

latitude

and

broad

discretion

is

not

without

its

These limits only exist where it can be shown, by the
attacking

the

trial

court's

decision,

that

evidence

"clearly preponderates against the findings," that there was a
"misunderstanding or misapplication of the law," that the trial
court's action is "flagrantly unjust" or that the trial court's

1
decision works such a harsh inequity as to give "clear evidence"
that the trial court has "abused its discretion."
not

shown,

nor

can

she

show

that

any

of

these

Plaintiff has
limits

were

exceeded because they simply were not.
All of the testimony relative to child custody developed the
issue as a "close call" —

a choice between "good and better."

The trial court made a specific

finding to this effect.

With

statutory direction the trial court found that Plaintiff's past
actions and conduct were not justified and caused the marriage to
fail.

The trial court specifically found that Plaintiff's living

arrangements in Salt Lake City were not in the best interests of
the children.

There was articulated disapproval of Plaintiff's

past moral conduct and a specific statement that such conduct was
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influential in the court's overall determination regarding
best

interests

of

the

children.

Finally,

the

trial

the

court

specifically found that the Plaintiff's lifestyle had changed and
that

the

change

did

not

work

to

the

best

interests

of

the

children or the family unit.
Cited cases have developed veritable "laundry lists" of nonexclusive or suggested criteria.

Many of the listed factors are

implicit in the trial court's pronounced findings.

For example,

the court didn't say that Plaintiff was "unstable"; however, it
did find that her lifestyle had changed.

The trial court did not

find that Plaintiff had demonstrated an unwillingness to function
as a parent; but it did find that the Plaintiff's standard of
living was not what it should have been and that Plaintiff had
chosen to pursue her persona] desires to the exclusion of the
family unit.

There is no requirement that the court consider all

available criteria and make a specific finding as to each.
word

games

should

not be condoned

or encouraged

on

Such

appellate

review.
The

appropriate

requirement

is, and

should

be, that

the

trial court articulate the specific findings on which the custody
determination was based.
in this case.
and commentary.

Such specific findings were articulated

They are set forth herein, with abundant review
These findings give substantial and significant

support to the custody

determination made by the trial court.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the findings, as articulated,
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do not evince any misapplication or misunderstanding of the law
nor

do

they

demonstrate

any

"flagrant

injustice" or abuse of

discretion.
An alimony award should be preceded by a finding that the
wife has needs which she cannot meet and that the husband has an
ability to meet those needs.
distinguished
accustomed

from

lifestyle

(In this context, "needs" should be

"wants.")
and

Also

an

considered

interest

is

the

In preventing

wife's

her

from

becoming a public charge.
In this case, both had grown accustomed to living beyond
their means.
income.

Both parties had a ^table and fairly respectable

Their employment potentials were bright, leaving little

concern of public burden.

In testifying concerning her "needs/1

Plaintiff stated that she "wanted" to go back to school.
anticipated

cost

of

$135

per

semester

calculations of need beyond this.

hour.

There

With an
were

no

Plaintiff arbitrarily stated

that she would "need" $200 per month.

Otherwise, this purported

"need" was unsupported by the evidence.

Without such evidence,

the trial court appropriately declined the request for alimony.
There

is

no

fixed

formula

distributions in domestic matters.

to

prescribe

property

In come cases the wife has

received a 40-60 split, in others a 1/3-2/3 split.

Such splits

are understood

trial

to be highly

discretionciry

level.
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at the

court

In the present
split

of

case, Plaintiff

approximately

$86,000

of

property with no responsibility

has been awarded
diverse

real

a 50-50

and

personal

for any of the debt.

She has

been awarded 1/3 of an $18,000 pension fund which can only be
liquidated

on

Defendant's

job

termination.

in-hand, Plaintiff complains of inequity

With

this

award

and charges abuse of

judicial discretion in the trial court's award which denies her
an additional $3,000.

Given the recognized discretion and the

relative equities, Plaintiff's assertions are meritless.
Plaintiff

has

failed

to

show

any

flagrant

injustice.

Plaintiff has likewise failed to show any materia] misapplication
or misunderstanding of the law.

There has been no showing of

evidence

against

which

"preponderates

the

findings,"

demonstrates any abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Plaintiff has

failed

or

Because

in all respects to carry her burden, the

trial court's decision should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this c>l/\<z/
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day of April, 1987.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

1987, four

certify

that on this

3 -^

day

of April,

(4) copies of the within and foregoing RESPONDENT'S

BRIEF were mailed to Craig M. Peterson, Esq. and Paul E. Wood,
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, first-class postage prepaid.
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ADDENDUM
1.

UCA § 30-3-5 (1985)

2.

UCA § 30-3-10 (1977)

3.

Decree of Divorce

4.

Findings of Fact

5.

Dr. Elizabeth Stewart's Custody Evaluation

6.

Partial Transcript of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony. (1) When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the maintenance and health care
of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court shall include
in even* decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court
may also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care, or the distribution of the'property as shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and
other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall automatically terminate upon the remarriage of that former spouse, unless that
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, in which case alimony
shall resume, providing that the party paying alimony be made a party
to the action of annulment and that party's rights are determined
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
shall be terminated upon application of that party establishing that the
former spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex, unless it is
further established by the person receiving alimon\ thai the relationship
or association between them is without any sexual contact.

%

30-3-10. * Custody of children. In any case of separation of husband
and wife having minor children, or whenever a marriage is declared void
or dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and proper. In determining
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and the
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's
desires regarding the future custody; however, such expressed desires shall
not be controlling and the court may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody otherwise.
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Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 9605

DONALD J. MARCHANT,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court, sitting
without a iury, on June 18th, 1986.

At that time, Plaintiff

appeared, together with her attorney, David L. Mower.

Defendant

likewise appeared, together with his attorney of record, Hans Q.
Chamberlain.

More than three months have elapsed

since the

filing of the Complaint by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff and Defendant
were each called to testify concerning said matter, together with
other witnesses.

The matter having been submitted to the Court,

and the Court having been fully advised in the premises, now
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Sevier

County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the time
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1 II
2 I

the Complaint was filed in this matter.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 8th,

3 I

1967, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and ever since said time have been

4

and now are husband and wife.

5

3.

The Court finds that Defendant has treated the Plaintiff

6

cruelly, both mentally and physically, and that the parties

7

simply cannot continue to maintain the marital relationship.

8

reason of the same, Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce,

9

final and effective upon entry, the Court, for good cause, having

10
11

By

waived the interlocutory period required by law.
4.

Two children were adopted by the parties, namely,

12

Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena

13

Marchant, born April

14

concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court

15

dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with

16

Plaintiff

17

visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from

18

his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City,

19

Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and

20

thereafter returning the children to the Plaintiff's home on

21

Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in

22

Central, Utah.

23
24

5.

22, 1977.

Pursuant to a Stipulation

in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been

In determining what is in the best interests of the

children for purposes of determining custody, the Court makes the

2b II f o l l o w i n g

specific

findings:

4BERLAIN
HIGBEE
JEYB AT LAW
SOUTH MAIN
• BOX 726
3AR

H

CITY,

84720
586-4404
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A.

That both the Plaintiff and Defendant are good

parents, and that both parties could be awarded custody of
the minor children.
B.

That the marriage entered into between Plaintiff

and Defendant was broken by the actions on the part of
Plaintiff, which were not justified.
C.

That when the Plaintiff vacated the family home in

Central, Utah, and moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in
September of 1985, she moved into an apartment and in
approximately November or December of 1985, her sister,
another woman who is divorced, moved in with her, together
with her minor child.

That the standard of living under
i

which Plaintiff has been residing while having the temporary
custody of the children in Salt Lake City, Utah, is not what
it should have been nor was it in the best interests of the
children.
D.

That during the latter part of the marriage between

Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff became involved v/ith
another man and this fact had an influence with the Court in
determining what is in the best interests of the minor
children.
E.

That during the latter years of the marriage,

Plaintiff's lifestyle changed and that change was not in the
best interests of the family unit, but rather the change was
pursuant to Plaintiff's desires and for her benefit to the
exclusion of the family unit.
3

1

6.

That by reason of the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

2

Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor

3

children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective

4

July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested

5

in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following

6

specific visitation privileges:
A.

7

Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m.

8

and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided however, that for

9

each Sunday while the children are in the care of the

10

Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church

11

and it can be a church of their choice.

12

B.

Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of

13

July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are

14

to remain in the care of the Defendant.

15

C.

A six-week visitation with the minor children

16

during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987,

17

at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties.

18

7.

By reason of the fact that the care of the minor

19

children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award

20

child support to either party.

21
22
23
24
2b

8.

The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to

alimony.
9.

The assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant are

awarded as follows:
A.

The family home located in Central, Sevier County,

Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt
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thereon which Defendant

shall be required

to pay

and

2

discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from

3

the payment of the same.

4

of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum

5

of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against

6

said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter

7

set forth.

8

follows:

9
10
11
12

Plaintiff is entitled to one-half

Said home is more particularly described as

Beginning at a point lying N 79°53f04"E for
2483.91 ' more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence
South along the west line of State Highway Right
of Way, for 104 f , thence West for 192.31*; thence,
North for 104 f ; thence East for 192.31 r to the
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more
or less.

13
B.

The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties

14
located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum

15
of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to

16
one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each.

The

17
farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold

18
on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be

19
distributed as hereinafter set forth.

The remaining 43.5

20
acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described

21
as follows:

22
PARCEL 1;

23
24
25
-AIN
.E
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Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24
South, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South
1.55
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North

5

10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains;
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway;
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said
railway to the place of beginning, containing
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section
15.

6

PARCEL 2:

7

13

Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14,
Township 24 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North
2.88
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North,
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains;
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx.
15.61 acres.

14

Excluding therefrom:

1
2
3
4

8
9
10
11
12

15
16
17
18

Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running
thence South along the west line of State
Highway Right of Way, for 104 f , thence West
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104 f ; thence
East for 192.31' to the point of beginning
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less.

19
PARCEL 3:
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
1.50 chains; thence North 12° 14' East along East
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains,
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35'
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less.

C.

The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby

awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant
shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in
said equipment.
D.

Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of

$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property.
To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a
lien against the farm property above-described
amount and when

the

farm

in said

is sold as ordered herein,

Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250,
and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant.

If

the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a
five year period, in yearly installments, together with
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum.
E.

The proceeds that will be available for

distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant.

7

1 ||

F.

The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that

2 ||

is surplus water over and above that which is needed to

3

irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per

4

share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June

5

18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided

6

equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant.

7
8

G.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the

personal property now in their possession.

9

H.

The photographs and family albums now in the

10

possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the

11

Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to

12

reproduce

13

thereafter.

14

family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the

15

same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff

16

to the Defendant.

17

10.

any of

said

photographs within

thirty

days

At the end of thirty days, said photographs and

The Court finds that as of June 18th, 1986, Plaintiff

18

receives as net income the sum of $1,321.00 per month, and

19

Defendant receives net income in the sum of $2,114.00 per month.

20

11.

The Court finds that Defendant has a vested interest in

21

his retirement by reason of his U.S. Government employment in the

22

approximate sum of $18,000, as of June 18th, 1986, and that

23

Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title and interest

24

in said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled

25

to $6,000 by reason of said vested interest.
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Said sum shall be

1

payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period,

2

together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum, payable at

3

the rate of $600.00 per year, together with accrued interest,

4

with the first annual payment of principal and interest to be

5

paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and

6

continuing thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until

7

the entire principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued

8

interest is paid in full.

9

said amount at any time without penalty.

10

12.

Defendant shall be entitled to prepay

Defendant shall be required to maintain health and

11

accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any

12

medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance,

13

Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same.

14

13.

The debts accumulated between Plaintiff and Defendant

15

after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party incurring the

16

same, with the exception of the medical and dental bills which

17

have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor children, which

18

shall be paid by Defendant as per the Temporary Order of the

19

Court dated October 2nd, 1985.

20

bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each required to

21

first submit the same to their respective carrier for payment and

22

in the event payment is not made, Defendcint shall thereafter pay

23

and discharge said medical and dental expenses.

24
25

14.

In connection with said medical

The Court finds that neither party is entitled to an

award of attorney's fees.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

2

1.

That Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

3

the Defendant, final upon entry, upon the grounds of physical and

4

mental cruelty.

5

2.

The care, custody and control of the minor children is

6

hereby awarded to the Defendant, effective July 1st, 1986, upon

7

the terms and conditions as set forth above.

8
9
10

3.

That the Decree of Divorce include and be consistent

with the Findings of Fact as above set forth.
DATED this

M,

'_ day of August, 1986.

11
12
D O N ^ . TIBBS
D i str i ct .Judge

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

20
21
22

'(5/lS/SC

DAVID L. MOWER
Attorney/for Plaintiff

23
24
25

NS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
ttorney for Defendant
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1

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

3

the within and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

4

to Mr. David L. Mower, JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main,

5

Richfield, Utah 84701, first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd

6

day of September, 1986.

7
8

Ifi'.ff'?-

,yy^r^-t

Secretary

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
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TY,

'20
4404

11

y<s

f

""jry

ccs s:r - 3 AM 9-1
l

2
3
4

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendant
250 South Main
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

-...cur.;

Zm^u^t

- VJIY

5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8

KAREN SCHUMANN MARCHANT,

9

Plaintiff,

10

vs.

11

DONALD J. MARCHANT,

12

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 9605

Defendant.

13
This matter having been tried to the Court, sitting without

14
a jury, on June 18th, 1986.

On said date, Plaintiff having

15
appeared, together with her attorney of record, David L. Mower,

16
and Defendant having appeared, together with his attorney, Hans

17
Q. Chamberlain, and Plaintiff and Defenant having been sworn to

18
testify concerning said matter together with other witnesses,

19
and the Court having been fully advised in the matter and having

20
made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefor;

21
IT IS HFREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DCREED

that

said

22
Plaintiff

be granted

a Decree

of Divorce

from

Defendant

23
providing as follows:
24
1.

The Decree of Divorce shall bcome final upon the filing

2b

of the same in the office of the Sevier County Clerk.
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1

2.

That two children were adopted by the parties, namely,

2

Brandon Justice Marchant, born February 1, 1974, and Sara Marlena

3

Marchant, born April

4

concerning temporary custody and subsequent Order by the Court

22, 1977.

Pursuant

to a Stipulation

i

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
-AIN

dated October 2nd, 1985, the children have been residing with
Plaintiff

in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Defendant has been

visiting with the children every other weekend by traveling from
his home in Central, Sevier County, Utah, to Salt Lake City,
Utah, picking up the children, returning to his home, and
thereafter returning the children to the Plaintifffs home on
Sunday evening and then again returning to Defendant's home in
Central, Utah.
3.

That pursuant to the Finding of Fact made herein, the

Court finds that it is in the best interests of the minor
children that their custody be awarded to Defendant, effective
July 1st, 1986, subject to reasonable rights of visitation vested
in the Plaintiff, including, but not limited to the following
specific visitation privileges:
A.

Every other weekend commencing Friday at 6:00 p.m.

and ending Sunday at 7:00 p.m., provided, however, that for
each Sunday while the children are in the care of the
Plaintiff, the children shall be required to attend church
and it can be a church of their choice.
B.

Every other holiday, commencing with the 24th of

July, 1986, except Christmas at which time the children are
to remain in the care of the Defendant.

:E
LAW
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C.

1

A six-week visitation with the minor children

2

during the summer months commencing in the summer of 1987,

3

at a time as may be mutually agreeable between the parties.

4

4.

That by reason of the fact that the care of the minor

5

children is to be awarded to Defendant, the Court does not award

6

child support to either party.

7
8
9
10
11

5.

That the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to

alimony.
6.

That the assets accumulated by Plaintiff and Defendant

are awarded as follows:
A.

The family home located in Central, Sevier County,

12

Utah, is hereby awarded to Defendant, subject to the debt

13

thereon which Defendant

14

discharge, and to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from

15

the payment of the same.

16

of the equity owned by the parties in said home, or the sum

17

of $17,000, and Plaintiff is hereby awarded a lien against

18

said home in that amount subject to payment as hereinafter

19

set forth.

20

follows:

21

27)

24

shall be required

to pay and

Plaintiff is entitled to one-half

Said home is more particularly described as

Beginning at a point lying N 79°53f04"E for
2483.91' more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S., R3W., SLB&M and running thence
South along the west line of State Highway Right
of Way, for 104', thence West for 192.31 f ; thence,
North for 104'; thence East for 192.31' to the
point of beginning and containing 0.47 acres, more
or less.

2b
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1

B.

The Court finds that the farm owned by the parties

2

located in Sevier County has a total net equity in the sum

3

of $43,500 and Plaintiff and Defendant are each entitled to

4

one-half of said equity, or the sum of $21,750 each.

5

farm, consisting of approximately 43.5 acres shall be sold

6

on or before June 18th, 1987, with the proceeds to be

7

distributed as hereinafter set forth.

8

acres of the farm to be sold is more particularly described

9

as follows:

The remaining 43.5

10

PARCEL 1:

11

Commencing 1.55 chains North and 2.25 chains West
of the Southeast corner of Section 15, Township 24
South, Range 3 West, of the Scilt Lake Meridian,
thence West 12.00 chains; thence South
1.55
chains; thence West 15.77 chains; thence North
10.00 chains; thence East 10.00 chains; thence
South 0.80 of a chain; thence East 6.95 chains;
thence South 2.13 chains; thence East 13.05 chains
to West line of Rio Grande & Western Railway;
thence Southwesterly along the West line of said
railway to the place of beginning, containing
20.74 acres, more or less, situate in the South
half of the Southeast quarter of aforesaid Section
15.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

PARCEL 2:

19
20
21
22

23
24
25
AIN
E
LAW
AIN
26

The

Commencing at a point 14.10 chains East and 86
links North of the Southwest corner of Section 14,
Township 2 4 South, Range 3 West, SLB&M; running
thence East 17.95 chains; thence North
2.88
chains; thence East 184 feet; thence North 85.42
feet; thence East 146 feet, more or less, to West
line of State Hwy. right-of-way; thence North,
along the same 104 feet; thence West 11.00 chains;
thence North 3.89 chains; thence West 10.50
chains; more or less, to the Canal; thence
Southwesterly along the canal 10.00 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning, cont. approx.
15.61 acres.

1

Excluding therefrom:
Beginning at a point lying N 79°53,04"E for
2483.91 f more or less from the SW Corner of
Section 14, T.24S.r R3W., SLB&M and running
thence South along the west line of State
Highway Right of Way, for 104 f , thence West
for 192.31'; thence, North for 104 f ; thence
East for 192.31' to the point of beginning
and containing 0.47 acres, more or less.

2
3
4
5
6

PARCEL 3:
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Commencing 1.55 chains North of the Southwest
corner of Section 14, Township 24 South, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
1.50 chains; thence North 12° ]4' East along East
Line of Rio Grande & Western Railway 4.10 chains,
more or less, to a point 7.05 chains North and
1.60 chains East of the Southwest corner of
aforesaid Section 14; thence East 13.35 chains to
Canal; thence Southwesterly along canal to Section
line; thence West 1.80 chains; thence North 9° 35f
East 1.55 chains; thence West 11.77 chains, more
or less, to the place of beginning.
Containing 7.83 acres, more or less.

14
15

The farm equipment owned by the parties is hereby

16

awarded to Defendant, provided, however, that Defendant

17

shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $1,500 for her interest in

18

said equipment.

19

D.

Plaintiff is therefore awarded the total sum of

20

$40,250 for her interest in the above-described property.

21

To secure payment of the same, Plaintiff is hereby awarded a

22

lien against the farm property above-described

23

amount

24

Plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the first $40,250,

25

and the excess, if any, is hereby awarded to Defendant.
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and when

the

farm

is sold

in said

as ordered herein,

If

the sale of the farm property fails to produce $40,250 to
satisfy Plaintiff's lien, Plaintiff shall be entitled to all
of the proceeds available for distribution at the time of
the sale, and the difference between that amount and the sum
of $40,250 shall constitute a Judgment against Defendant and
shall be payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a
five year period, in yearly installments, together with
interest on said amount at the rate of 8% per annum.
E.

The proceeds that will be available for

distribution between Plaintiff and Defendant arising from
the sale of 15 acres of the farm property due and payable in
August of 1986, consisting of approximately $8,000 shall be
equally divided between Plaintiff and Defendant.
F.

The 21.53 shares of water owned by the parties that

is surplus water over and above th£it which is needed to
irrigate the farm, having an estimated value of $1,000 per
share, shall be sold by the Defendant on or before June
18th, 1987, and the proceeds therefrom, shall be divided
equally between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
G.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded all of the

personal property now in their possession.
H.

The photographs and family albums now in the

possession of the Plaintiff are to be delivered by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant and he shall be entitled to
reproduce

any

of

said

photographs within

thirty

days

6

¥6

1

thereafter.

2

family albums are to be returned to the Plaintiff in the

3

same condition as when they were delivered by the Plaintiff

4

to the Defendant,

5

7.

At the end of thirty days, said photographs and

That Defendant should be awarded all of the right, title

6

and interest in his retirement account with the U.S. Government,

7

said retirement, provided, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to

8

$6,000 by reason of said vested interest.

9

payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff over a ten year period,

Said sum shall be

10

together with interest, payable at the rate of $600.00 per year,

11

together with accrued interest at the rate of 8% per annum, with

12

the first annual payment of principal and interest to be paid by

13

the Defendant to the Plaintiff on June 1st, 1987, and continuing

14

thereafter on said day of each succeeding year until the entire

15

principal in the sum of $6,000, together with accrued interest is

16

paid in full.

17

at any time without penalty.

18

8.

Defendant shall be entitled to prepay said amount

That Defendant shall be required to maintain health and

19

accident insurance on behalf of said minor children, and for any

20

medical or dental costs which are not paid for by said insurance,

23

Defendant shall be required to pay and discharge the same.

22

9.

That the debts

accumulated

between

Plaintiff

and

23

Defendant after October 2nd, 1985, shall be paid by the party

24

incurring the same, with the exception of the medical and dental

25

bills which have been incurred by the Plaintiff and the minor
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1

children, which shall be paid by Defendant.

2

said medical bills to be paid by Defendant, the parties are each

3

required to first submit the same to their respective carrier for

4

payment and in the event payment is not made, Defendant shall

5

thereafter pay and discharge said medical and dental expenses.

6
7
8

10.

In connection with

That neither party is entitled to an award of attorney's

fees.
DATED this

22

A,0

9
10

r~

11

DON V. TIBBS
District Judge

12
13
14
15
16
17

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

18

X' -jJ< JSkUy^'-

19

DAVID L . MOWER
A t t o r n e y / f o r PJ,ain

^U'dtit-

20

i

HANSQV

ttorney

CHAMBERLAIN
for Defendant

23
24
25
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1
2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

3

the within and foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to Mr. David L. Mower,

4

JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER, 151 North Main, Richfield, Utah 84701,

5

first-class postage prepaid, on this 2nd day of September, 1986.

6
7

•'<s-~

Secretary
8

\

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2!J
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Marchant v. Marchant
C i v i l Number 9605 1
S e v i e r Cc. , U^aii
Psycnoloqical Fvaluation of
Donald Marchant
Background
*
Mr. Marchant was raised in Kamas, Utah where he met
M W * . Marchant. He was a graduate of BYU and has worked as a
civil e{|9;^neer for the Forest Service for about fifteen
years.
Mr. Marchant met Mrs. Marchant after he returned from
a LPS mission. They dated for about nine months and were
married in September of 1967. He was attracted to her
because she was cute, intelligent, and lively.
He felt the marriage went quite well and did not
recognize signals that the marriage was drifting apart. He
recognized that after she suffered a whiplash injury in a
car
accident
she became
depressed
and was severely
restricted in her activities. This was shortly before Sara
was born.
At about that time they bought a farm near
Richfield, Utah which took quite a bit of Mr. Marchant's
time. As he looks back, he recognizes that Mrs. Marchant
felt ne<^J#cted. He recalls that she asked him to talk to
ner and to do things with her. He did not feel that those
things were very important until much later on.
Mrs. Marchant suffered another injury to her neck
about three y$„ <s #f#er the first injury. She continued to
have periods of depression and the marriage did not seem to
be as happy for her as it was satisfying for him. When Sara
was about six-years-old Mrs. Marchant decided to go to work
and Mr. Marchant did not object. However, he felt that the
marriage
deteriorated
after
that
point
because Mrs.
Marchant seemed to be more interested in working. He was
critical of her friends and felt that she was being
flirtatious with male workers. He was particularly annoyed
that she was so flattered by the attention of other men. He
was also self-conscious because he had a prominent position
in the Church and was concerned about how other people in
the community might view them. While she denied having any
interest in other men, Mr. Marchant really could not shake
that conviction.
When Mrs. Marchant made some business
trips to Salt Lake she apparently met her boss on at least
one
occasion,
which
only
added
to Mr. Marchant's
suspiciousness and jealousy.
They went to counseling in

nm
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late 1984.
It appears that each of them had suggested
counselinq to the other and each had felt unimpressed with
the other's suaqestion. By the time they went to counseling
in late 1984 Mrs. Marchant did not like tc be touched
pnysically and was beginning to show a qreat deal of
hostility toward his physical advances. He recognized that
the marriage was permanently doomed when he lost control
and hit her. He moved out of the home on March of 1985 when
she made it clear that she needed some breathing space. He
had a hard time understanding that their separation was
goin^ to be permanent, and he still has a great deal of
difficulty letting go of her. Apparently Mrs. Marchant has
never made it really clear to him what her complaints were.
This may have undoubtedly contributed to his anger toward
her .
Personal Qualities
Mr. Marchant is a very bright, well-informed person
whose reasoning is thoughtful and incisive.
He is an
intense, high energy person who is efficient and productive
and who expects others to be the same. He has good selfcontrol most of the time. His personality is basically a
passive-aggressive one in which hostility i^'not frequently
expressed directly; it is modified and channeled by his
education,•social expectations, and self-control so that it
appears in the form of competition, dominance, and in more
oblique
forms
such
as uncboperativeness,
insistence,
argumentativeness, and an inclination to retaliate when
slighted, His rather proper social manner and well-defined
sense of personal identity, as well as his self-control,
contribute to efficiency and stable lifestyle.
Mr. Marchant is socially somewhat extroverted in the
sense of being poised and confident. He is also optimistic
and rather trusting in that he assumes his ideals and
expectations will be honored by others.
He is not
gregarious nor dependent upon social interactions for
personal satisfaction but he does get along well with
people in well defined situations. He has definite ideas
about right and wrong, stands up for what he believes, and
is not much influenced by what other people think. He may
discount other people's opinions or needs and may not
negotiate well with others who differ with him on issues.
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Mr. Marchant has a strong need for affection which is
not easily met because he is such an independent and
somewhat demanding person.
Relationship with Brandon and Sara
Mr. Marchant has a very close parent-child bond with
both children. The relationship is a close and trusting
one. fie is genuinely concerned about their welfare and has
a great affection for the children. He is aware of their
individual differences and their needs for individual
attention. He has strong moral standards and is attentive
to their intellectual and social development.
Mr. Marchant i? very concerned that the children have
someone with them after school during the school year as
well as during the summer months. He recognizes that both
he and.'Mrs. Marchant will have to work but he feels that he
is better able to provide for suitable care than is Mrs.
Marchant. His interest in doing welj. and being responsible
in a small community is a distinct asset. While he has
passive-aggressive personality and some tendencies to be
hostile, this side of his personality is not frequently
shown to the children and probably would not create much of
a problem. He seems to recognize that his teasing did not
go over very well with Mrs. Marchant and that it may have a
negative effect on the children if he were to treat them in
the same manner.
Mr. Marchant feels that the,children would be better
of with him because of what he perceives as Mrs. Marchant's
drift from family responsibilities into a more active
personal and social life where moral values may be
sacrificed.
He is also convinced that the children will
have a healthier lifestyle in a small town where they are
well-known and where there are healthy activities in
addition to adequate schools.
Mr. Marchant's motivation for custody is sincere and
is based upon good values. His present interest is with the
welfare of the children; he is not using the custody
dispute as any type of retaliatory gesture toward Mrs.
Marchant.
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Attitude Toward Mrs. Marchant
Mr. Marchant has an uneasy relationship with Mrs.
Marchant.
He
recognizes
that
the marriage
is not
salvageable although he very much wishes that were not so.
In spite of feeling that her personal and social activities
wa.ll be detrimental to the children by decreasing her time
with them, he is not inclined to sabotage the mother-child
relationship. His interest in the welfare o£ the children
is too strono to engage in any kind of retaliation. He
recognizes the children's affection for their mother, her
love for them, and the fact tnat she has been a good mother
p
ven thougn he is critical of the amount of time that she
cnose to be away from the children at a time in their life
where this was a discretionary matter.
If Mrs. Marchant
were awared custody, he would cooperate
in honoring
visitation arrangements.

Capacity for Custody
Mr. Marchant is a very responsible adult who is very
much aware of the need for stability, guidance, nurturing
in the home. Mr. Marchant's desire for custody is certainly
genuine and realistic, and he would be an adequate
custodial parent.
Procedures Used
MMPI
16 PF Test
Rotter Sentence Completion
Subtests from the WAIS-R
Custody Questionnaire
Individual interview
Joint interview with Mrs. Marchant
Observations with the children

Elizafbeth B. Stewart, Ph.D.
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology
EBS/esw
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Marchant v. Marchant
Civil Number Q 60^
Sexier Co^nt", Ut-h
Psychological Evaluation of
Karen Marchant
Background
Mrs. Marchant is a thirty-seven-year-old woman born in
Elko, Nevada, and raised in Clover Valley (close to Wells,
Nevada), and later in Peoa, Utah. Her father died when she
was twelve years old in an accident on the farm. When she
was sixteen years old her mother moved the family of five
girls and three boys to Peoa where she bought a beef and
daiTy operation.
/4rs. Marchant was very close to her family and
especially to her twin sister, Kathy. Because she was a
twin and also because the family lived in very small towns
there was a lot of reliance on each other.
Mrs. Marchant attended the Brigham Young University
for two years prior to her marriage to Mr. Marchant when
she was eighteen years old. The marriage was fine at first
but she felt that it began to deteriorate after about five
years because of what she perceived to be Mr. Marchant's
demands, particularly in sexual matters. She felt that he
was a controlling person who needed her to conform. She was
accustomed to pleasing other people and enjoyed pleasing
him until she felt that the relationship was one-sided
because he expected too much from her.
The marriage relationship was also strained following
a whiplash injury which resulted in a great deal of pain
and depression.
This injury was followed by another
whiplash injury about three years later. Pain, depression,
and
dissatisfaction
with
her
marital
relationship
continued. She recognized that her depression and long
periods of sleep in the daytime were no way to live and
that her her life was getting out of control. She decided
that working would be an opportunity to get out of the home
and to become more productive. At first she felt that Mr.
Marchant approved of her working because the income helped
them in the purchase of their farm. However, she felt that
later he became jealous and suspicious of the men with whom
she worked.
She dismissed his suspicions of her
relationships as being obsessive and unjustified. Her
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experience at work gave her confidence as well as a new
dimension to her life.
There were frequent arguments,
usually about her work and work relationships. Apparently
he hit her on two different occasions, one of which knocked
her down and caused oruises on her face.
This was
particularly painful because she was havinq a lot of pain
witn the soft tissue in*)ury around her neck from the
previous automobile accidents.
Hitting had not been a pattern in their marriage. Mr.
and Mrs. Marcnant both had some counseling followinq that
occasion. The counseling was especially helpful to her in
sorting out some thinqs and being less fearful of what
other people would say if it were generally known that she
and Mr. Marchant were navmg marriage problems. There had
been no history of divorce in the families and sne felt
quite uneasy about disappointing other people and their
expectations.
The Marchant's were in therapy about October of 1984.
They separated during March of 1985. Mrs. Marchant remained
in the family home with the children. When the position she
held in Richfield was terminated in the Summer of 1985 she
moved to Salt Lake City where she was able to continue her
employment with Intermountain Health Care.
Personal Qualities
Mrs. Marchant is a very bright, well-informed,
quick-thinking person. She learns quickly, adapts well, and
appears to be a very efficient as well as - sociable
individual.
Mrs. Marchant is an optimistic and selfconfidant person who has high standards for herself and
others. She is outgoing and deals well with other people
because of her poise and ability.
Her interests are
traditionally feminine and she is somewhat passive in her
relationships.
Sne has a strong need for affection;
pleasing other people and being accepted contribute to her
strong motivation to do well. She is an ambitious person
with a lot of resources whose success comes from a
cooperative
rather than competitive style.
She is
relatively inpeturbable and can function under quite a bit
of stress. She is sensitive to other people's feelings as
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well as to her own.
her .

Empathy and sympathy come naturally to

It appears that Mrs. Marchant may be embarking on the
divorce with more confidence and optimism about the future
tfran may be justified. Her mannerisms and appearance draw
otner people to her but she may mistake attention and
interest for genuine affection and dependable long-term
relationships. Her very dutiful behavior during the early
part of her marriage resulted from her passive tendencies
and her acceptance of church sanctioned role expectations.
Her success in the work force subseauently demonstrated
that sJ>ev.can fine satisfaction without being submissive. It
appears that she is rebelling in this divorce as much as
she is removing herself from a subtly hostile and demanding
marital relationship..
Relationship with Brandon and Sara
Mrs. Marchant has a close parent-child bond with each
child. She had been the primary caretaker until she began
work and since that time has maintained that role albeit
with much less time with the children. They have become
accustomed to sitters for after school and summer hours.
She relates well to them and they to her.
Attitude Toward Mr. Marchant
Mrs. Marchant feels she could no longer live with Mr.
Marchant because his interest in sex was so demanding that
he did not respect her need for less intimacy. In addition,
she would not risk any further physical assaults. She
resents his blaming her "being so cute" as the reason for
his attraction to and need for her. She felt valueless to
him outside their physical relationship. The separation and
divorce allow her to feel good about herself.
Mrs. Marchant acknowledges Mr. Marchant's positive
effect on the children, his love for them, and their need
for him.
She would cooperate in visitation if she had
custody.
She would be very surprised if she did not get
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custody and had to deal with him and arrange her own visits
with the children.
Capacity for Custody
Mrs. Marchant is a sensitive person who is capable of
providing a home and nurturance to the children but who may
have difficulty meeting their needs, her work schedule, and
her personal agenda for a more rewarding personal social
life. At present her shared home costs and responsibilities
reduce the burden so that life is a lost easier than it
will be when, and if, Helen moves out. The children will
not be so well cared for eventually if they have to Shift
for themselves after school and in the summer in a
neighborhood that is not as close and caring as the one
they know m Monroe and Central, Utah. Mrs. Marchant's
desife for a better life for herself very probably will be
a disadvantage for the children who may be exposed to a
less desirable lifestyle.

Procedures Used
MMPI
16 PF Test
Rotter Sentence Completion
Individual interview
Joint interview with Mr. Marchant
Interviews with the children

Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D.
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology
EBS/esw
3/86
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Marchant v. Marchant
Civil Number
9605
Sevier County, Utah
Psychological Evaluation of
Brandon Marchant
Brandon is a twelve-year-old, sixth-grade student at
the William Penn Elementary School which he has attended
since the Fall of 1985. He reports that he likes school and
chat he usually gets good grades, which is a sign of good
adjustment.
Brandon lives with his mother and sister in a four
bedroom apartment which is shared with his mother's sister,
Helen, and her eight-year-old son. Helen is also in the
process of divorce. The two mothers are sharing quarters
whilfe they get settled as single parent families. Brandon
likes the arrangment and gets along with his cousin.
Brandon is an alert, personable child who is outgoing
and quite good in sizing-up situations. He seems to make
friends easily because he is confident of himself and
interested in other people.
While Brandon misses his friends in Monroe and Central,
Utah as well as the opportunity to ride horses, he also has
enjoyed doing things in Salt Lake which were not available
to him in the rural area. He mentioned attending the
Pirates of Penzance, Sleeping Beauty, and three symphony
concerts this year with his Mom and Sara. Although he
recognizes that there are many things to do in Salt Lake he
is careful not to show any preference for living in Salt
Lake.
He is looking forward to playing Little League
Baseball in Central, Utah as soon as he gets out of school
in early June. He has managed to maintain his relationships
with neighbors in Monroe and Central during his visits with
his father on weekends.
Brandon has a very good relationship with both parents
and he feels secure with both. The divorce is very hard on
him because of split in his family.
Nevertheless, he
understands that his parents will not be living together
and he has adjusted as well as can be expected to that
situation.
He is very careful about not expressing any
preference for either parent and, indeed, he probably has
none. He does not want to be responsible for deciding where
he lives.

Brandon Marchant
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Procedures Used
Joint interview with Sara and his parents
Individual interview
Kovac's Emotional Inventory

—,

Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D.
Diplomate, Clinical Psychologist
EBS/esw
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Marchant v. Marchant
Civil Numoer 9605
'Sevier County, Utah
Psychological Evaluation of
Sara Marchant
Sara is nearly nine-years-old and is in third grade at
William Penn Elementary School. She transferred from Monroe
Elementary School which is near Central, Utah when her
mother moved to Salt Lake early in the Fall of 1985.
Sara is an alert, affectionate child who makes friends
easily.
She is observant, thoughtful, and adept at
interpersonal relationships. She misses her friends in
Monroe and Central, Utah although she has made friends
here. At the present time she and her brother, Brandon, are
living with their mother in an apartment which is shared
with her Aunt Helen (who is in the process of a divorce),
and an eight-year-old cousin. Aunt Helen is usually home
after school, but may not continue to be available if she
finds employment during the coming months.
Sara ihas beeji#jwicluded in a "Lunch Bunch* at school
which % is compose* of new transfer students. They meet
weekly. She also hias had some exposure to a counselor for
children of divorce wh*dh she also enjoys. These support
groups will be helpful and should be encouraged since she
shows some signs of depression, sadness, and loneliness.
Sara has a good relationship with both parents and
gets alona v^ry well with them although she sees her mother
as being more easily aroused to anger and more inclined to
yell than is her father. She expresses no preference for
living with one parent or the other, and does not want to
be responsible for such a decision. Her desire is clearly
to live with both parents although she recognizes that this
will not occur. Sara, like Brandon, wants the decision
about where she will live to be made by other people.
Sara will adapt well to either home. She may find more
stability in her father's home, however, since her mother
is renting and may have difficulty in maintaining the
comfortable
apartment
when her sister,
Helen, is
economically able to establish her own living situation.
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Procedures Used
Kovac's Emotional Inventory
Draw Family Test

.

Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D.
Diplomate, Clinical .Psychology
EBS/esw
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Marchant v. Marchant
Civil Number
9605
Sevier Co. . Utah
Recommendations
Custody
The many factors to be considered in custody can be
grouped into three categories: (1) Parent related factors;
(2) Child related factors; and (3) Situational factors. The
parent-related
factors and their applicability to the
Marchant case are as follows:
1. Willingness to sacrifice for the welfare of the
children.
Mrs. Marchant has not been
inclined to
subordinate her need for autonomy, success, and personal
satisfaction in favor of the children's need for her time
and attention at a period in her life when working was a
personal choice and not an economic necessity. Even so, the
children apparently fared quite well because of her warm
and nurturing relationship when she was with them, and also
because the children had a strong sense of belonging and
happiness in the home, school, and community. Now that the
divorce is imminent, neither parent has the option of
cjis^etionary employment. However, Mr. Marchant does not
need nor value his job to provide himself or establish a
new social life as much as Mrs. Marchant. He is established
and stable. For this reason he may have less anxiety and
conflict about the division of time and concern between
home and work. He is more likely to use his after work
hours ^in home and family-related activities while Mrs.
MarcharmL is still establishing her vocation and personal
identiy.
She may not have the same stable community
recognition that would put her at ease during after work
hours, but her personal happiness may make her obligations
less burdensome.
2. Emotional Stability. Mr. Marchant is stable in the
sense of being a dominant and rigid personality as well as
being well-established in his job. Mrs. Marchant is more
flexible, seeks to please others, and is in the process of
developing an identity as a single parent by choice rather
than by necessity. The difference between the two people is
not one of best-worst, but is a qualitative difference. The
children have gotten along well with each parent so far and
could adjust to either adult, not because the adults are
the same in the personalities and emotional stability but
because of the strong parent-child bond that exists.
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3.
Moral Character. Tnis factor is difficult to
address in a time of changing social and personal values
and standards. Mr. Marcnant is more staid and traditional
in his values. His conduct has not raised the issue of
moral
character.
Mrs. Marchant is more inclined to
experiment with ner new-found freedom. Whether her choices
will create moral conflicts in the future is uncertain but
not improbable.
4. Sympathy tor and understanding of the children.
Both parents have this quality although Mrs. Marchant is
more demonstrative. However, she has not been so empathetic
and understanding of the children's needs as to sacrifice
ner own need for freedom for the children's need for a
two-parent family.
. 5. Religious Compatibility, There are no religious
conflicts in this family, but Mrs. Marchant seems to have
some -reservations that would make it uncomfortable as well
as unrewarding for her to accompany the children to church.
Mr. Marchant has no such reservations.
5.
Financial Ability. Mr. Marchant's training and
experience as a civil engineer commands a higher salary and
better job opportunities than does Mrs. Marchant's training'
and experience. She is less likely to have the same level
of income potential or job opportunities so that her
standard of living will not be as
great unless her
household is substantially subsidized by child support or
she remarries someone who is not being drained by his
child-support obligations.
6.
Sincerity and Desire for Custody. Both parents'
desire
for
custody
is sincere
and
not
based
upon
retaliation or any intent to manipulate the other.
7. Personal rather than surrogate care. Neither parent
has any advantage
in providing personal rather than
surrogate care. At present Mrs. Marchant's sister provides
a family connection in the afterschool care but this may
not last long if she finds employment for herself. Mr.
Marchant's situation in a small, close community provides
more neighborly support by people who have known the
Marchant children and who may be able to provide a more
personal care than would neighbors in the Salt Lake area
who do not know the Marchants so well.
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8.
Alcohol or Drug Usage. Neither parent has any
problems with alcohol or drug usages and there is no reason
to think that custody would be effected by this factor.
The child-related factors are the following:
1

• The childrens 1 feelings, special needs, preference,
and bond with the parents. None of these factors show any
clear preference for either Mr. or Mrs. Marchant.
The
children are basically quite well adjusted and choose to
state no preference for either parent. Both children have
very strong feelings of love for both parents and the
parent-child bond is very strong.
Situational factors:
1. Maintaining a satisfactory custody arrangement when
the children are happy and well-adjusted.
There is a
preference for leaving a custody arrangement in place where
it is clear that they have made a reasonably good
adjustment, and there is no reason to think that they are
not doing well
or that a different custody arrangement
would be clearly better for them. In this respect, both of
the Marchant children have adjusted well although it is
quite clear in observing them with their father that they
miss him a great deal. It also seems likely that Sara's
depression and feelings of loneliness are related to her
father's absence. However, if she were living with her
father she may well feel as sad and lonely because of her
mother's absence.
2.
The least disruptive placement. Since the children
are doing well in their mother's custody at the present
time the least disruptive placement would be to leave them
in her custody.
3.
Primary Caretaker. Although Mrs. Marchant has
worked full-time in recent years, she has been the primary
caretaker. Mr. Marchant, however, has provided direct care
also although the division of parental responsibilities has
been quite traditional in this family. Mrs. Marchant could
continue as she has; Mr. Marchant could adapt to being the
primary caretaker.
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The custodial decision will clearly have to be made in
view of other factors which are not covered by the custody
evaluation. Both parents truly have the best interest of
the children at heart and the children clearly need
continuing relationships with both parents.
Visitation
Visitation was discussed with Mr. and Mrs. Marchant.
Currently Mr. Marchant sees the children on alternate
weekends by driving the children to and from Monroe. He has
also tried using bus services from Salt Lake to Richfield
and the return trip by auto.
Wnile this is quite a
financial and time burden on Mr. Marchant, he prefers to
keep that arrangement rather than simplifying visits by
seeing the children only on three-day weekends during those
months that have Monday holidays, i.e., January, February,
March-" or April (when Spring break occurs), and in May,
September, October, and November.
If Mr. Marchant had
custody, Mrs. Marchant would arrange to go to Richfield to
visit the children where she would visit with an aunt and
uncle from whose home she could manage visits with the
children. Both of the parents will probably be able to work
out an agreeable visitation schedule after the custody
decision is made. Each is mindful of the otherfs burden in
traveling.
It would be advisable to have a definite visitation
schedule in writing even if the parents agreed informally
to deviate from that schedule. Each parent is likely to
begin dating and perhaps remarry within the next year or
two during which time there will be some pressure to vary
the visitation schedule, often at the inconvenience of the
other parent. In order to avoid disputes about visitation a
written schedule would enable the visiting parent to
maintain contact and would prevent the custodial parent
from acting as a gate keeper
for his or her own
convenience.

Elizabeth B. Stewart, Ph.D.
Diplomate, Clinical Psychology
EBS/esw
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regularly before

the

above

matter

came o

Don V.
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5:30 P.M.
18 JUNE 1986
COURT FIKDIBGS & RffLIIfGS
THE COURT:

These

Court, in all honesty.
have sat

are very difficult cases for the

You know I

just know

that you folks

here all day and when I handle criminal matters the

whole morning, one after another where I sent
to prison,

four young men

where probably a lot more are going to go, things

you didn't see.
I examined,

You didn't see the

presentence reports that

and on each one of them they came from separated

families, every one of them.
I don't justify their conduct, but I'm just saying that's
what it

comes from.

I see in those cases the same pattern,

over and over again.
anyone else,

They

total and

give

nothing

complete living

of

themselves to

for their own bene-

fits, broken homes, problems in school, and then it's alcohol
and

drugs,

petty

crime,

and

then

all

of

a sudden it's

graduated into the criminal system and I've got them.
And then I sit and grant divorces the rest of
Law & Motion days.
today.

Think of the number of divorces I granted

Most of the* are stipulations.

I approve

the day on

the stipulations.

They just come in and

They go out and then every once

in awhile I get one like this where the parties are obviously
good people,

but things

I've got to start
that they're

in.

have gone wrong and all of a sudden

trying to

make a

And frankly,

decision from

it's traumatic

the mess

to me.

You
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don't think it is, but it's ray responsibility to hear
make

the

best

decision

1

it ar

can make and I obviously err no

going to make people happy in that job from what I find.

Bu

that's what I do as I see it.
As

I

see

it,

this

case

basically, it's for the bes

interest of those children and I have heard
I have

the evidence an

to do what I think is right at this point and regard

less of where the problems fall.
Counsel

have

submitted

everything else.
and I'm

the

And

I appreciate

exhibits

and the evidence an

And be that a& it may, this

making it

at this time.

the wa1

is my decisioi

Frankly, I'm having a ver

difficult time finding grounds for a divorce.
I'll be honest.
iff sues,

I have difficulty with

alleges grounds.

this Defendant's done
her.

Maybe that

what the Plaint-

I have difficulty finding where

anything

wrong,

was justified.

other

than slapping

I don't believe in it.

don't believe anyone should use force and violence.
having difficulty.
see where I can
that

I'm

going

force them
to

to live

find

that

because he

together.

the Plaintiff

So based or

the Defendant did treat the
physical and

struck her

mental anguish,

on the one occasion

when he was what appeared to me highly provoked.
that fact,

But I'D

However, under the circumstances I don't

Plaintiff cruelly, causing her
physical anguish

1

is awarded

which under the circumstances I think

Based upon

the decree of divorce,
these parties

have to
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be divorced.

Normally,

1*11

leave

tence, but I'm going to
become absolute

the interlocutory
terminate

and final

upon the

interlocutory period being waived
be divorced

and I

it.

see no

period in exisThis

decree shall

date of this entry, the

because I

advantage to

think they must

anyone to have that

continued.
The Court awards the parcel

of

real

property

with the

corrals and the 1 1/2 acres of land with home located thereon
to Mr. Marchant, ^the Defendant

in

assume the

Plaintiff harmless from those

debt and

hold the

debts and obligations.
$17,000 equity

this

The I Court

in that

house as

action.

finds

of this

that

He shall

she

has a

date and I'm just

going to hold that off for a moment.
The

Court

approximately 43

finds

that

acres of

the

parties

have

a

home with

land that's now disposable, which

the Court finds is valued at $2,000 an acre and has a debt on
it of

approximately $1,000

an sere, so that the Court finds

there is a $43,500 value of that property.
Now let me just make sure I'm not missing this.
43.5

acres

valued

at

$2,000

an

acre

There's

with debt on it of

approximately $1,000 per acre; that's right, isn't it?
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes.
THE COURT:
equity in

So that the Court finds

that property

that the

there's $43,500

parties have.

The Court
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finds that
that

the Plaintiff

$43,500,

or

she

has consequently

half interest In

has $21,750 equity in that property.

The Court finds that there's another

$8,000 due

and each of

the parties are entitled to $4,000 of that money.
The

Court

finds

that

they have assets in water stock.

The Court orders that water stock
shall be

sold by

the Defendant

sold

at

this

time.

It

within a period of one year

and the proceeds 50 percent to each of the parties.
The Court finds

that

they

have

$5,000

worth

of farm

equipment and the Court finds that there was some division of
a household furniture and a mistake on it.

Icm

that

Plaintiff for the

the

Defendant

should

pay

to

the

parties interest in the farm equipment the sum

going to say

of $1,500 and

he's awarded the farm equipment.
If my mathematics are right, I'm adding $17,000, $21,750,
and $4,000, and if my mathematics are correct it comes out to
$42,750; do you agree with that, gentlemen?
that's what it is.

The

Plaintiff is

Check it.

Well,

awarded the Judgement

against the Defendant for that $42,750.
The farm

shall be

sold within

a period of one year and

all of the proceeds of that farm shall be applied against the
$42,750.

The balance will go to the Defendant.

doesn't bring the $42,750, then
judgement against

the Defendant

the

Plaintiff

If the farm
will

have a

for the balance, which will

be payable with interest at the rate of

8 percent

per annum
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1 M
2

over a 5-year period on an annual basis.

||'

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
THE COURT:
The Court

I'm sorry, five years?

Five years.

makes the

specific finding that the Plaintiff

5

h has a net take home of $1,321 per month, the

6

II net of $2,114 a month.

7
8

All of the Defendant's right to title and interest in and
jl to his retirement shall be awarded to the Defendant, subject,

9

however,

that

he

shall

pay

to

the

10

$6,000, which $6,000 shall be payable

11

at $600

12

percent per annum on the unpaid

13

earlier,

14

direction.

15

16
17

Defendant has a

||

per year

if

he

for 10

wants

MR. MOWER:

Plaintiff the sum of
over a

years together

to,

10-year period

with interest at 8

balance.

So he

but it shall be payable in that

Excuse me, Your Honor.

That means that

he will pay $600 plus.
THE COURT:

Plus

interest.

And I'll make it on an

18

annual basis, any particular time you want to.

19

on September 1st of each year.

20

on June 1st, starting on June 1st, 1987.

We'll make it

Well, this year we 1 11 make it

21

No Attorneys fees are awarded to either party.

22

The Court

23
24
25

can pay it

specifically finds

that no

alimony should be

awarded to either party in this matter.
The Court

finds that

both parties are good parents, and

both parties could be awarded custody of the

minor children.
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1 I

The

Court

does,

2

b r o k e n u p by a c t i o n s

3

that they

find that this m a r r i a g e h a s been

of the

Plaintiff, and

are not justified.

* I have been in the
5

however,

commenced, by

finds

And even though these children

Plaintiff's custody

prior order

the Court

since this

action was

of the Court, the Court is of the

6 || opinion that in the best interest of the children the custody
j
7 j should be awarded to the Defendant.
8 !
9

The Plaintiff

is a w a r d e d the right of r e a s o n a b l e

tion at reasonable times

and places.

So

10 j| q u e s t i o n o n v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , the P l a i n t i f f
it

other holiday, commencing with

12 j Christmas where
13

the children

the 4th

that there

is nc

is a w a r d e d

every

of July,

shall stay

visita-

except for

in the home of the

custodial parent.

14

The Court finds that the Plaintiff

15

six

weeks

16

that time when she desires.

17 I
18

visitation

in

shall be

awarded for

this summer at a six-week period,

(PLAINTIFF began crying and

collapsed to

the floor

at her Counsel*s table in the Courtroom.)

19

THE COURT:

20 | party.
21 j

Ro Attorneys fees are awarded to either

You better call in the EMT's
[ W H E R E U P O N the B a i l i f f r e s p o n d e d ,

22 j m e m b e r s of

along with

family

the P l a i n t i f f a n d her C o u n s e l , M r . M o w e r , to help

23 I t h e P l a i n t i f f o u t

of

the

Courtroom

and

to

give

aid and

24 | assistance to her.]
ji

25 [j

THE COURT:

Do

you want me to go forward, Counsel,
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1

ii or do you want me to wait?

2

[j

MR. MOWER:

I think you

ought

to

go

forward,

3 jj think it will be some time for her to gain her composure.
4
5

THE COURT:

All right.

|j that the Defendant shall

It's the order of the Cour

find findings

of fact, conclusion

6

of law and decree for the conformity of this record.

7

purpose of the record

8 j that the
9

I think

Plaintiff is

that I

very emotional

should make

For th<
a recor

because of this orde:

and has collapsed In the Courtroom.

10

The Court makes specific findings that

11

taken

these

children

to

*2 jj under Court order, that

Salt

ment, jointly

14

a minor child in that apartment,

15

opinion

16

|| action was

17

|| standard

18

that

been living

in an apart

with her sister who is a divorced woman havin

the

change

had has
of

Lake while she has had the

they have

13

the Plaintiff ha;

and

the

Court

is

of th<

of the custody since this divorc

not been

living

and

in compliance

with the norma

standards these parties had befor

this action was filed.

19

''

20

|| become involved with another man and that was a factor in th

21
22
23

24
25

The Court makes a specific finding that the Plaintiff ha:

Court's decision.
I

The Court makes a

|| lifestyle has
longer for

specific finding

changed and

the family

that her

unit, but

that the Plaintiff1:

concern is basically n

for the

purpose of accom

|| plishing her own desires,
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New gentlemen,

I want to rrake any findings that ycu feel

2 II you would like rr;e to make for the purpose of

the record, and

1
*>

i

3

Mr. Mower,

4

state it now, please.

5

if you

MR. MOWER:
to

schedule

have something you'd like me to find, you

I

think it

would be

important for the

a

transfer

based on the Court's order.

6

Court

7

There's going to be need for a change on the custody.

8

THE COURT:

Has school

9

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

terminated?

On the 14th, it terminated in Salt

10 |[ Lake, Your Honor.
11
12

THE COURT:

will be

believe I better make these rights

13 I ifin going
14

Transfer

to make

I

of reasonable visitation.

specific visitation, she shall be able to

I take the children every other Friday until Sunday

15 | they shall be returned by 7:00 o'clock.
16

made on July 1st.

night when

So she can take them

by Friday at 6:00 p.m., return them by 7:00 p.m. Sunday.

But

17

church of their choice so that they

19

shall be in church in view of the lifestyle of these p a r t i e s .

18 || the children shall attend

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Your

20

the

21

contimiing with the 4th of July

date

of

22 | effect that

change.

The

might have

Honor, just
Court

awarded

and I f m

one question on
her visitation

wondering about the

on the children to change and I just

23 | raise that for discussion.
24
25

THE COURT:
| following holiday.
I

Well,

maybe we

better make

it on the
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MR. MOWER:

The 24th.

THE COURT:

All

right.

Theyr11 have visitation on

the 24th.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
THE COURT:

Instead of the 4th?

Instead

of

the

4th.

Now,

is there

anything else, Mr. Mower?
MR. MOWER:
THE

I don't have anything further.

COURT:

I'd

like

to,

if

you

can think of

anything I missed, I want to make a complete record.
MR. MOWER:

Nothing else I can think of.

THE COURT:

Mr. Chamberlain?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:
THE COURT:
gentlemen.
help that.

I think not, Your Honor.

Thank you.

I'm sorry

I appreciate

it's been

submit them

findings of

to opposing

but I can't

Thank you.

fact, conclusions of

Counsel at least five days

before you send them to me, I!ll assume
when I get them.

your courtesy,

so traumatic,

This Court will be in recess.

If you111 prepare your
law and

No.

that they're correct

So make your findings.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

I will submit them and ask him to

sign them because of the time.
MR. MOWER:
THE COURT:

I appreciate that.
Thank

you.

This

Court

will

be in

recess.
[WHEREUPON Proceedings

were completed in the matter
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1

herein.]
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12
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